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METAMORPHOSES OF THE IDEAL

ABSTRACT. For Evald Il'enkov, philosophy is a science of the ideal. Il'enkov spent his entire life researching the logical and historical metamorphoses of the ideal. In general, he considered the ideal as a relation between at least two different things, one of which adequately represents the essence of another. At various times Il'enkov explored quite a few ideal phenomena: forms of value and forms of property, personality and talent, language, music and fine arts, not to mention numerous categories of dialectics, ethics, and aesthetics. The article also addresses the problem: which of these phenomena is the most typical and adequate form of being of the ideal?.

KEY WORDS: concept, consciousness, dialectical logic, dialectics, form of value, Il'enkov, psyche, representation, Russian Marxism, the ideal

The category of the ideal (*ideal'noe*) formed the “axis” around which Il'enkov's thinking continuously revolved; not surprisingly, since he considered the ideal and its phenomena to be the only genuine subject of philosophy. Philosophy is the science of the world of ideas and the ideal – it has no other subject, Il'enkov believed.

In this article, I will tell how, beginning with the 1960's, Il'enkov's theory of the ideal took form. I will also deal to some extent with the polemic surrounding the concept of the ideal which Il'enkov pursued during his life and which has continued dramatically after his death.

I

Starting at the end of the 50's, Il'enkov, then a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy, took part in the grandiose publishing project of the *Filosofskaija enciklopediia*.¹ He began as a regular

contributor, but during work on the second volume he participated as a non-staff editor for the section on dialectical materialism. Seven of his articles appeared in that volume, including *Ideal* (first part) and *Ideal'noe*.²

The second volume of the encyclopedia came out in 1962. Until that time, the category of the ideal in Marxist philosophy had been something of a “sacred cow.” It always appeared in the first chapters of textbooks, in the story of “the great historical confrontation between materialism and idealism,” and it wandered so often and freely across the pages of philosophical literature that people had almost stopped paying attention to the concept. All discussions of the ideal began with the ritual citation of the Afterword to the second edition of Marx’s *Capital*:

The ideal is nothing other than the material, transposed and translated inside the human head.³

This formula is certainly redolent of radical materialism. The problem is how to understand this “translation,” and, however odd it may sound, what the “human head” is?

Il’enkov insisted that Marx had in mind not the bodily organ of an individual *Homo sapiens*, growing out of his neck at the mercy of Mother Nature, but precisely the *human* head – a tool of *culture*, not of nature. The ideal is not concealed in the heads of men. Its body does not consist only of the brain, but also of any thing that is created by man for man. Products of culture are nothing but “*the organs of the human brain created by the human hand*, the reified power of knowledge,” Marx writes in the *Grundrisse*.⁴

The brain of a particular man generates something ideal only when he engages in the work of the collective “brain” of mankind – culture. In certain historical conditions, however, the world of human culture becomes alienated from its creator, stands opposed to the human individual as a dominant, impersonal subject (God, *absoluter Geist*, *Weltvernunft*, and so forth). This historical fact of the alienation of material conditions and the results of human activity forms the basis for idealism and religion. The ideal, Il’enkov argues, is an attribute

of human activity in nature, its special, cultural–historical dimension. Everything that falls within the ambit of this activity receives the imprint of ideality and, as long as the activity continues, becomes a residence and instrument for the ideal.

Il'enkov defined the ideal as the “determinate being (*nalichnoe bytie*)⁵ of an external thing in a phase of its entering into the activity of the [human] subject.”⁶ It is a form of activity, the copying of the form of a thing, or the form of a thing which has separated from its own matter in the process of human activity. The ideal exists only *at the very moment of conversion* of the form of a thing into the form of activity, and *vice versa*. As soon as human activity has stopped, at that instant the ideal fades away. “Nature loves to hide,” said Heraclitus.⁷ In a similar manner the ideal does nothing but hide itself. That is *its* own nature.

It is what is not, and yet is... It is being, which, however, is equal to non-being.⁸

To sum up Il'enkov's view, the ideal is the subjective being of the object, its non-being in itself, and being in another and through another. In the terms of Hegel's logic, the ideal is the *Anderssein*. In describing the ideal form of value in *Capital*, Marx used the Latin idiom *quid pro quo* – one instead of another.

Forms of ideal being, or non-being, are as diverse as nature itself. There is no thing in the universe, into whose natural body an ideal could not settle down, and likewise the nature of any thing can be expressed in an ideal form. In this sense, the ideal is an infinite and eternal attribute of Nature. Words and numbers, money and moral sermons, categories of logic and images of art – they all are modes or, if you will, phenomena of ideal reality. Il'enkov explored all these phenomena.

Unfortunately, he had to abandon the work on the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija*. Starting with the third volume, the editor-in-chief, academician F.V. Konstantinov,⁹ decided to increase the amount of material on formal logic to the detriment of the section on the categories of dialectics. Il'enkov vigorously protested, and he ended up leaving.

II

By the middle of the 1960s, Il'enkov's name was already known in the West, largely due to the Italian translation of his first book.¹⁰ In the spring of 1965, Il'enkov was invited to the USA to give a lecture at a symposium at the University of Notre Dame. At first the authorities of the Moscow Institute of Philosophy gave their permission, and Il'enkov set to work. His pupil and friend, Lev Konstantinovich Naumenko told me how impatiently and enthusiastically Il'enkov waited for this trip. Unfortunately, when the high officials read the manuscript of his lecture, they preferred to keep its author at home, under the pretext of his "hospitalization." The text was nevertheless sent and printed in the volume of material from the symposium in English translation.¹¹

The theme of the symposium was "Marx and the Western World." In the eyes of Il'enkov the philosopher, this was nothing other than a mode of the general problem of the ideal: the opposition of two *social ideals* – collective and private ownership of the conditions of human life.¹² In the article he wrote for the symposium, Il'enkov naturally defended the superiority of the ideal of collective property. In doing so, however, he expressed an idea which probably had cost him the trip to America: Il'enkov considered the form of property established as a result of the socialist revolution to be merely the "formally legal negation" of private property.¹³ That was, he wrote,

the purely formal conversion of material and spiritual wealth, which was the property of private individuals ("proprietors"), into "public property" ...¹⁴

This and several subsequent passages, in which Il'enkov explained his assertion, had no chance of getting by the censors, and they were struck from the text of the lecture. The original which was preserved in the archives saw the light of day only a quarter century later, after the author's death. Il'enkov dared to declare that the property of the socialist state is "public" only formally, in a purely legal sense. However, in reality, in

economic practice the socialist form of property remained as *private* as before.

For Il'enkov, the communist ideal consists in transforming the private property expropriated by political revolution into "the real property of each individual, each member of this society." Appealing to Marx, Il'enkov stands in sharp opposition to the communist ideologues who assume that

communism is exhausted by the transformation of private property into the property "of society as such," i.e. of the impersonal organism standing opposed to each of the individuals who comprise it, and is embodied in the "state."¹⁵

The state, in the person of officials supervising the flow of philosophical thought, could by no means welcome such judgments directed its way...

Il'enkov once again was soundly berated by those in charge, but soon the situation took a turn for the better. In 1965, he was awarded a prize by the Academy of Sciences for his research in dialectics and logic; and in 1968 the post of director of the Institute of Philosophy went to Pavel Vasil'evich Kopnin – who admired Il'enkov and understood him well. The first thing Kopnin did was to force him to defend his doctoral dissertation.

In the same year, Il'enkov's second book appeared, *Ob idolakh i idealakh* [On Idols and Ideals].¹⁶ This small book, addressed to the young reader who knows little about philosophy, begins with a satirical story about thinking machines and a Black Box. The author follows the adventures and metamorphoses which the beautiful ideal endured over the course of the long history of mankind. The idea of the book reminds one of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The beautiful ideal travels through minds and lands, assuming various forms, and often suffering privations and misfortunes as it collides with stubborn reality.

Unfortunately, Kopnin died in 1971, and everything returned to the way things had been. B.S. Ukraintsev was named the head of the institute; he was a man who was highly inventive and malevolent in figuring out ways to torment Il'enkov right up to the moment of the latter's tragic death.

III

In 1968, the journal *Voprosy Filosofii* published an article by David Izrailevich Dubrovskij, “Mozg i Psikhika” [The Brain and the Psyche],¹⁷ which attacked Il’enkov’s theory of the ideal and similar views shared by another philosopher, Feliks Trofimovich Mikhailov. Thus began a prolonged polemic about the nature of the ideal which has not ended to this day.

For Dubrovsky the “ideal” is a full synonym for the “subjective,” a certain psychic reality which, on the one hand, reflects the external, material world, and, on the other hand, is “informationally isomorphic” to states of the human brain. This very much resembles the conception of the human mind which has been defended by English materialists since the time of Bacon of Verulam. In my opinion, David Bakhurst flatters Dubrovskij when he writes that

Dubrovsky’s idea of “subjective reality” reproduces the principal features of the Cartesian conception of the self.¹⁸

However, for Descartes, the self (*ego*) is a thinking substance by definition distinct from material things and events, including states of the brain; whereas Dubrovskij considers thinking as an attribute of “neurodynamical structures” of the human brain. This is a completely ordinary, not to say vulgar, form of materialism and empiricism, compared with which the Cartesian dualism of mind and body looked like an enormous advance.

Il’enkov reacted to the criticism at once. Three months following Dubrovsky’s piece, *Voprosy Filosofii* published his reply to Dubrovskij – “Psikhika i mozg” [Psyche and Brain].¹⁹ Here Il’enkov does not deal with the concept of the ideal as such,²⁰ preferring to direct his attention to such phenomena of the ideal as *personality*, *talent*, and *genius*, while elucidating on the degree to which man’s life activity is determined by his psychophysiology or by social circumstances and culture.

At this very time, all of Il’enkov’s attention was consumed by the so-called Zagorsk experiment a group of psychologists were conducting with blind–deaf children. He tried to discern

the moment of birth of the ideal in the “natural,” not yet human psyche. He wanted to see with his own eyes the most mysterious event in the universe – the origin and emergence of the human self, and further, to discover the laws, according to which the world of ideas and ideals is formed and shaped in the soul of a young child.

Here we have the unique opportunity to fix with almost mathematical exactness the real conditions which solely determine the birth of such phenomena as consciousness, self-consciousness, thinking, imagination, aesthetic and moral feelings [...] The process of forming the specificity of the human psyche is extended in time, especially in the first – decisive – stages, and therefore can be viewed under “time’s magnifying glass,” as if it were being seen in slow motion film.²¹

At least the general principle of the formation of the human personality was quite clear for Il’enkov from the outset: insofar as the substance of the ideal consists of the objective world of culture, the living body of the child must be actively connected to this world. With the same goal in mind, the teachers at the Sokoljanskij-Meshcherjakov school developed the method of “cooperative–dividual activity” of teacher and child. This activity is structured

in such a way that the child gradually adopts all those specifically human ways of conscious interaction with the surroundings, which are objectively fixed in the forms of things created by one human being for another.²²

Consciousness and will arise naturally here as forms of orientation in the reified world of culture; just as simple sensuality (spatial images, sounds, smells and tastes) serves to orient living being to the external natural world.

IV

Il’enkov summed up his long investigation of the ideal and its phenomena in a voluminous manuscript *Dialektika ideal’nogo* [Dialectics of the Ideal] which was, undoubtedly, a genuine

masterpiece of philosophical reflection, although its author never managed to see it in print. Six times (!) Ukraintsev removed *Dialektika ideal'nogo* from the list of books the Institute of Philosophy planned to publish. Il'enkov was in despair. To be sure, in 1977 a significant part of the manuscript appeared in "an abridged and amended" English translation by the Cambridge Slavist, Robert Daghish.²³ A Russian version, also somewhat pared down and with an amended title, appeared in print almost immediately after Il'enkov's death in 1979.²⁴

What we find here is simply a surgically precise analysis of the structure of ideal. For Il'enkov, the term "ideal" denotes a *relation between at least two different things, one of which adequately represents the essence of the other*. This ideal relationship is established in the process of the activity of a thinking being, initially in the course of practical hand work, and only afterwards as a form of mental activity.

In nature there occur various relations of representing some *external properties* of things, but not their essences. Even feeling this supreme form of natural representation, seizes and holds the mere *exterior* of things.²⁵

Meanwhile, only the form of the expression of the *essence* of things, i.e. of the laws and causes of their being, has the right to be called "ideal." Moreover, this expression must be pure and absolutely adequate. Human activity, as it were, turns its object "inside out," dissecting the flesh of its transient being "here and now" and cleansing its essence from the slag of time, to present that essence in an ideally pure form – *sub specie aeternitatis*. This activity draws that border between being and non-being, where the ideal resides.

In order for the expression of the essence of a thing to be ideally pure, the natural body of some *other* thing must become the material for this expression. The thing commends its "soul" to another thing, and this latter appears as a symbol. Thus a diplomat symbolically represents his country, money represents the value of all commodities, and words represent the meaning of various things in culture.

Thus, the ideal is a representation *in and through another*. Besides, it is always an *adequate* representation, and an expression of the very *essence* of things. As such, this essence is material. Only the form of *Anderssein*, which is imparted to the essence by human activity, appears to be ideal. The ideal is the very material, turned *inside out by its essence*. It is not merely a form of consciousness, as the empiricist believes. In consciousness, the ideal form of human activity closes on itself and attains, to use Hegelian terminology, being-for-itself (*Für-sich-sein*).

Consciousness, in fact, only arises where the individual is compelled to look at himself as if from the side – as if with the eyes of another person, the eyes of all other people ...²⁶

Temples and statues, books and paintings, computers and musical instruments, and, above all, the cortex of the cerebrum, are the models and instruments by means of which the ideal form of activity performs this closing on itself.²⁷

V

The polemic over the concept of the ideal did not end with Il'enkov's death. On the contrary, the matter took an altogether new turn after the publication in 1984 of a large fragment of Mikhail Aleksandrovich Lifshits' manuscript, *Dialog s Eval'dom Il'enkovym* [A Dialog with Eval'd Il'enkov].²⁸

Lifshits belonged to the older, pre-war generation of philosophers. He mainly studied aesthetics, was a superb stylist, and had an encyclopaedic frame of mind. Lifshits was on friendly terms with Il'enkov from early times, and nobody knows exactly why he began his "dialog" about the ideal only after Il'enkov's death. Without doubt, Lifshits was a much more knowledgeable and sophisticated opponent than D.I. Dubrovskij, I.S. Narskij, and others of that ilk. The main point of his objections to Il'enkov was that the ideal exists not only in the realm of human activity, but also far beyond its limits – inside any particular thing.

The ideal is present in everything, it is both in material being and in consciousness, it is both in society and in nature, or else it exists nowhere at all.²⁹

In that case, what is it that Lifshits called “the ideal”? He means

certain limits, that our sensual perception gives us in experience [...] These limits are an ideal gas, an ideal [perfect] crystal – the real abstractions which one could approach, in the same way that a polygon with an infinitely growing number of sides approaches a circle. All the structure of the universe [...] rests upon norms or patterns which can be reached only through infinite approximation.³⁰

As a matter of fact, that is exactly a meaning of the word “ideal” in natural language: a perfect model or pattern of something, or a practically inaccessible standard which is cut-off by a chasm of infinity from real things striving toward it. Moreover, Lifshits’ definition resembles the “transcendental” concept of the ideal in Kant or Fichte,³¹ although it must be said that the founders of German classical philosophy saw in all those “real abstractions,” which Lifshits takes for “ideals,” forms of human activity ...

For his part, Il’enkov leans on Marx for whom the term “ideal” (*ideelle*) served to describe the peculiar, “sensually supersensible or social” (*sinnlich übersinnliche oder gesellschaftliche*) reality.³² However, Lifshits simply takes no interest in this phenomenon of *Anderssein* – of active “representing” of one object by another, and of the “ideal positing” of one thing as another.

In essence, Lifshits objections amount to saying that one must *classify* the “ideal” not by the type of phenomena studied by Il’enkov, but by a quite different set. So their polemic had no common point of reference. Instead of two different *concepts* of one and the same matter, they dealt with two different *objects*, designated by one and the same word, “the ideal.” That is the long and the short of Lifshits’ “dialog with Il’enkov.”³³

Nevertheless, over the last 20 years, a plethora of articles on this topic have been written and dozens of papers read at the

“Il’enkov Readings,”³⁴ and not long ago a whole book was published.³⁵

VI

Within the framework of Il’enkov’s theory of the ideal, the gravest and most vexed problem, in my opinion, is that of the *adequate forms* of being of the ideal.

Il’enkov himself investigated, inspired by the Marxist critique of political economy, the value form of commodity exchange as the “most typical and fundamental, purely ideal.” The distinguishing characteristic of this form lies in its complete indifference to its own manifestation:

It is an immediately universal form, completely indifferent to any sensually tangible material of its “embodiment,” its “materialisation.” The form of value is absolutely independent of the peculiarities of the “natural body” of the commodity into which it “incarnates” and in which shape it is represented [...] It always remains something different from any material, sensually tangible body of its “incarnation,” from any corporeal reality.³⁶

It seems that the *logical* explanation of the ideal formulated here breaks with the generally accepted usage of this word and with the related *aesthetic* understanding of the ideal as something beautiful, lofty, and *in suo genere* perfect. Many who have read these lines have thought that Il’enkov’s “ideal” is a cold, abstractly logical construction which has lost any kinship with principles of beauty and morality. Otherwise, how could one explain that the most typical phenomenon of the ideal for Il’enkov is not a painting, a book or a musical score, but such a base thing as money?

In Marx’s manuscripts we find a collection of pejorative epithets, with which the geniuses of poetry and high drama, like Sophocles, Goethe, Shakespeare, awarded money the “form of value.” The latter subtly grasped money’s characteristic feature as its indifference to the nature of things, by calling gold the “common whore of mankind.”³⁷ And despite of this, these same poets quite often mention gold in the most elevated figures of speech. People call this metal “noble,” and the epoch of the ideal well-being of the human race is called “the golden

age.” In Plato’s *Politics* we learn that gold should prevail in the souls of the ideal rulers – philosophers. Heraclitus likened the eternal primal fire from which the Universe originates to gold:

All things are exchanged for Fire, and Fire for all things, even as wares for gold, and gold for wares.³⁸

Let us note that Heraclitus is speaking not about the chemical element *aurum*, but about the *money form of value* taken by gold. The “grandfather of dialectics” applies this value form to the genesis of all things in the Universe. He almost foresees, feels by the thin skin of his mind, the universal character of exchange relations, the *ideality* of the “wares for gold” connection. Whereas in those ancient times the commodity–money relations were still terribly far away from *real* universality; they had not yet had time to turn into “classics of the world.”

Leaving aside allegories, we can point to one more “thing” which corresponds perfectly to Il’enkov’s description of the value form. This is the *concept*, in the classic sense of the word, as a form of understanding the nature of things. The concept, inasmuch as a mind possesses it, remains forever the same in any of its countless material guises – in letters and sounds, numbers and lines, neurons and electrons. Like money, the concept can change its outward appearance with ease and be present in a thousand different places at the same time. For instance, the concept of a temple is present simultaneously inside the architect’s head, in his blueprints and within the stone “body” of the temple.

The concept is the ideal in its own essence, nothing is more ideal. As compared with money, the concept obviously looks like a far better candidate for the title of the form “most typical and fundamental, the purely ideal.” I believe that, when arguing about the ideality of the value form in Marx, Il’enkov constantly kept in mind, as a logical hallmark, Hegel’s *Begriffsbestimmung* (definition of the concept).

The concept is the ideal in *general*, while money is ideal *in suo genere* only – strictly within the limits of the world of commodities or exchange values, where money was born. Inside that market area money was and still remains the optimal,

purest and supreme possible expression of value. Here it is the *ideal* commodity, a beautiful ideal at which all other commodities “cast amorous glances” (Marx). These platonic, ideal glances cast at money are nothing else but *prices*. Gold, in turn, has become the ideal money.³⁹

However, the entire ideality of money evaporates at that very moment when we leave the realm of commodity relations, the very relations whose essence is ideally presented in the money form of value. In money viewed *abstractly*, as an artistic image or moral postulate, there is nothing ideal.

If when compared with money the concept has the advantage of universality, then when compared with other universal forms of the ideal activity of man – works of art and moral values – the concept has another advantage. This is the ideal purity of the representation of the nature of things, attainable due to the diabolical indifference of the concept to its *Anderssein*. Only one thing is demanded of the concept: it must adequately express the essence of its object, i.e., it must be true. *Absolutely any* thing can serve as material for the expression of this essence. Such is the ideally malleable nature of the concept.

Neither artistic images nor moral norms can boast of such a truly infinite freedom of expression of the nature of things. Their organic unity with the sensual-material conditions of human activity is a sign of less purity and less “transparency” (in comparison with the concept) of the ideal *Anderssein*, which they grant to things. However, right here lies *their* advantage over the logical form of the concept: the ability of immediately, sensually concrete perception of essences. It is the aptitude fostered by art and morality “to see the whole ahead of its parts” (Goethe), without which not a single new concept will emerge.⁴⁰

Taken together, these three universal modes of the ideal, known to all under the names of Truth, Good, and Beauty, form the human soul, or, in other words, the person. The personality of a man is three-dimensional, as is his organic body. In every single person we find the immediate actuality of the ideal – “actuality” in Hegel’s sense, as essence which has appeared.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My warm thanks are due to Dr. Frederick Choate (University of California, Davis), who helped me to translate this article into English.

NOTES

¹ *Filosofskaja enciklopedija*, vols. 1–5, Sovetskaja Enciklopedija Publishing House, Moskva, 1960–1970. Over the course of 10 years, hundreds of authors worked on this project, including a considerable number of foreign philosophers.

² Both “ideal” (noun) and “ideal’noe” (adjective) are translated as “the ideal.”

³ “... Das Ideelle nichts anderes ist als das im Menschenkopf umgesetzte und übersetzte Materielle” (*Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels, Werke*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin/DDR, 1962, Bd. 23, S. 27).

⁴ “Sie sind von der menschlichen Hand geschaffne Organe des menschlichen Hirns; vergegenständlichte Wissenskraft” (*Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (Rohentwurf) 1857–1858*, Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1953, S. 594).

⁵ “*Nalichnoe bytie*” is a loan Russian translation of Hegel’s term *Dasein* (literally, “being there”).

⁶ ‘Ideal’noe’, in: *Filosofskaja enciklopedija* vol. 2, p. 222.

⁷ Φύσις δὲ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν κούπτεισθαι φιλεῖ [B 123 DK].

⁸ “Ideal’noe”, loc. cit.

⁹ In 1962 Konstantinov became director of the Institute of Philosophy; prior to then he had occupied high positions in the Communist Party.

¹⁰ Il’enkov, E.V. *Dialektika abstraktnogo i konkretnogo v “Kapitale” K. Marksa*, Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk, Moskva, 1960. – E.V. Il’enkov, *La dialettica dell’astratto e del concreto nel Capitale di Marx* (traduzione dal russo di Vittorio Strada e Alberto Sandretti, introduzione di Lucio Coletti), Feltrinelli Editore, Milano, 1961 [ristampa 1975].

¹¹ Il’enkov, E.V. “From the Marxist–Leninist Point of View,” in Nicholas Lobkowitz (ed.), *Marx and the Western World*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame – London, 1967, pp. 391–407.

¹² A short time before, Il’enkov’s long article on a closely related topic had appeared in the *Voprosy Filosofii*. See Il’enkov, E.V. “Problema idealna v filosofii” [The problem of ideal in philosophy], *Voprosy Filosofii* 10 (1962), pp. 118–129, and 2 (1963), pp. 132–144. That very theme had, over the years, been discussed in the circle of friends who gathered at Il’enkov’s flat.

Some of them subsequently went abroad or were expelled from the country for anti-Soviet comments, like Aleksandr Zinov'ev.

¹³ "From the Marxist–Leninist Point of View," p. 399.

¹⁴ Il'enkov, E.V. "Marks i zapadnyj mir" [Marx and the Western world], *Voprosy Filosofii* 10 (1988), p. 105.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁶ Il'enkov, E.V. *Ob idolakh i idealakh*, Politizdat, Moskva, 1968.

¹⁷ "Mozg i psikhika," *Voprosy Filosofii* 8 (1968), pp. 125–135.

¹⁸ Bakhurst, D. *Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov*, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 240.

¹⁹ "Psikhika i mozg," *Voprosy Filosofii* 11 (1968), c. 145–155.

²⁰ Not because he "deems Dubrovsky's theory unworthy of serious refutation," as Bakhurst surmised (op. cit., p. 241). Il'enkov devoted quite a lot of time to polemics with empirical conceptions of the ideal, both in the *Filosofskaja enciklopedija*, and especially in his later works (in *Dialektika ideal'nogo* a sizeable portion of criticism is addressed directly to Dubrovskij's views). But at that time Il'enkov was entirely engrossed in another aspect of the problem of ideal, namely the conditions of the formation of human personality and talent.

²¹ Il'enkov, E.V. "Psikhika cheloveka pod "lupoj vremeni"" [The human psyche under 'time's looking glass'], *Priroda* 1 (1970), p. 89.

²² Il'enkov, E.V. "Stanovlenie lichnosti: k itogam nauchnogo eksperimenta" [The genesis of a person: on results of a scientific experiment], *Kommunist* 2 (1977), p. 74.

²³ Il'enkov, E.V. "The Concept of the Ideal" (translated, abridged and amended by Robert Daglish), *Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of Dialectical Materialism*, Progress, Moscow, 1977, pp. 71–99. A few of the first paragraphs, I should venture to guess, belong to Daglish, not to Il'enkov. Incidentally, Sholokhov's *Tikhij Don* came out in a Daglish translation as well. Not "amended," I hope.

²⁴ Il'enkov, E.V. "Problema ideal'nogo" [The problem of the ideal], *Voprosy filosofii* 6 (1979), pp. 128–140, and 7 (1979), pp. 145–158.

²⁵ We speak about organic sensuality, not touching here those ideal senses of a human being which, according to Marx, had "become theoreticians." – "Die Sinne sind daher unmittelbar in ihrer Praxis Theoretiker geworden" (*Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844, Werke, Ergänzungsband, Erster Teil*, p. 540).

²⁶ Il'enkov, E.V. "Dialektika ideal'nogo" [Dialectics of the ideal], in: *Iskusstvo i kommunisticheskij ideal* [Art and the communist ideal], Iskusstvo, Moskva, 1984, p. 68. I prefer to cite this edition, for it follows the original more closely than the others, although it, too, cannot be considered to be completely authentic.

²⁷ But money, for example, does not figure in that list, being an ideal form and tool of a *material* (economic) process. Money is not a form of consciousness, but a form of social *being*. Consciousness just *reflects* this

ideal form *post festum* and in a mysterious, irrational form, as Marx asserted.

²⁸ Lifshits, M. “Ob ideal’nom i real’nom” [On the ideal and real],” *Voprosy Filosofii* 10 (1984), pp. 120–145. Recently the book has been published in full. See: Lifshits, M. *Dialog s Eval’dom Il’enkoyam* [Dialog with Eval’d Il’enkov], Progress-Tradicija, Moskva, 2003.

²⁹ *Ob ideal’nom i real’nom*, p. 123.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ “Das Ideal ist also das Urbild (*Prototypen*) aller Dinge, welche insgesamt, als mangelhafte Kopien (*ectypa*), den Stoff zu ihrer Möglichkeit daher nehmen, und indem sie demselben mehr oder weniger nahekommen, dennoch jederzeit unendlich weit daran fehlen, es zu erreichen” (I. Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 1990, S. 556). – “The ideal is, therefore, the archetype (*prototypen*) of all things, which one and all, as imperfect copies (*ectypa*), derive from it the material of their possibility, and while approximating to it in varying degrees, yet always fall very far short of actually attaining it” (I. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (trans. Norman Kemp Smith), Macmillan Education Ltd., Hampshire, 1929, p. 492).

³² *Das Kapital*,” *Werke*, Bd. 23, S. 86.

³³ For more detail about Lifshits’ criticism of Il’enkov’s theory of the ideal, see: Majdanskij, A.D. “O mysljashchej sebja Prirode i ideal’noj real’nosti” [On Nature thinking itself and on an ideal reality], *Voprosy Filosofii* 3 (2004), c. 76–84.

³⁴ The annual international conference which has been held by Il’enkov’s disciples since 1990. In 2004, the Il’enkov Readings took place under the auspices of the Russian State University of the Humanities. There were scholars from Finland, Germany, USA and countries of the former USSR.

³⁵ *Ideal’noe: Il’enkov and Lifshits* [The ideal: Il’enkov and Lifshits]

³⁶ “Dialektika ideal’nogo,” pp. 26-27.

³⁷ “Timon of Athens,” Act IV, Scene III.

³⁸ Πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ πάντων ὄκωσπερ χρυσὸν χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός [B 90 DK].

³⁹ “Ideelles Geld oder Wertmaß wurde das Gold ...” (K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, p. 123).

⁴⁰ On this point see Il’enkov’s article “Ob esteticheskoy prirode fantazii” [On the aesthetic nature of fantasy],” *Voprosy estetiki* 6 (1964).

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